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Executive summary and recommendations 
This report examines the challenge of adequately addressing adaptation to climate change 
impacts in developing counties by means of international collaboration, and why it is in the 
interest of industrialised countries, including the EU, to do so. This is a topic that has been 
rising in prominence on the agenda of the international climate change negotiations under the 
auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as well 
as in other international forums. After exploring different approaches to the problem of adapting 
to climate change and reviewing ongoing efforts to adapt to climate change, the report puts 
forward a range of options.  
The report starts from the premise that adaptation is vitally important because climate change 
impacts are already taking place and will worsen. Moreover, the communities most vulnerable 
to those are the poorest. Climate change could seriously compromise their development 
prospects in the absence of effective, proactive adaptation. Up to now, however, international 
climate activities have focused mainly on mitigation, and progress on adaptation is thought to be 
following roughly a decade behind. 
I. Key Messages  
Adaptation work has matured from discrete, localised solutions toward a more comprehensive 
development-based perspective. This has drawn policy-makers’ attention towards the possibility 
of making adaptation part of development policy. i.e., mainstreaming. Although interest is 
growing, industrialised countries’ development agencies still appear to attach relatively little 
attention to adaptation.  
1.  Given the magnitude of the challenge, adequate adaptation will require considerable 
additional financial flows from industrialised countries to developing countries. It is 
generally accepted that industrialised countries bear a certain legal and moral responsibility 
to support adaptation in developing countries. Such support is also warranted on the basis of 
enlightened self-interest, given the fact that in a globalised economy severe climate impacts 
in developing countries would take their toll even in industrialised countries. The key to 
unlocking significant financial flows lies with a reasonable assurance that developing 
countries have enough absorptive capacity to use those funds toward effective and efficient 
adaptation activities. This will require improvements in knowledge and expertise, 
institutional strength, good governance, transparency and accountability. To facilitate this 
debate, a discussion about the source of the financing (i.e. how to share the burden) should 
not wait for all the questions about implementation (i.e. how the financial resources are used 
for developing country adaptation) to be resolved.  
2.  The need to support both facilitation and implementation of local adaptation activity poses 
challenges in terms of integrating across scales, from local to national to international. More 
knowledge is especially needed on i) effective implementation measures (e.g. through 
demonstrations and pilot programmes), ii) required technological innovations, iii) capacity 
building and institutional strengthening, and iv) “scaling-up” of successful local activities,, 
i.e., exchanging and replicating best practices . 
3.  As to the potential institutional framework, it is as yet unclear what a ‘Legal Instrument For 
Adaptation’ (with binding commitments) would look like or whether such an instrument 
would be the best solution. In theory, existing mechanisms (Official Development 
Assistance, the existing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
Kyoto Protocol funds, emerging insurance instruments, etc.) could be used, although it 
remains to be seen whether they are capable of generating adequate resources and achieving 
their objectives. Should industrialised countries prefer existing mechanisms and frameworks ii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
to a legal instrument, they must ensure that adequate funding would be committed and 
demonstrate that sufficient adaptation will occur. 
II. Five suggestions for the way forward 
1.  Evolutionary regime: The aim should be to establish a sequential and evolutionary regime, 
with preparatory work undertaken as soon as possible. This would make it possible to 
allocate much higher levels of resources to scale up current adaptation initiatives at a later 
date. Industrialised countries should already start undertaking a number of such preparatory 
actions to set up adaptation schemes. Such measures could include: 
a)  Earmarking funds for risk reduction and disaster management, given that a modest 
amount of prevention and timely response produces a large return in terms of avoided 
damage to property and reduced human suffering. 
b)  Providing funding to learn from demonstrations and develop mechanisms to exchange 
best practices for adaptation. 
c)  Identifying ways to increase the capacity of developing countries to absorb adaptation 
resources and make effective and efficient use of them: 
i.  by identifying the factors that hamper demand for adaptation in developing 
countries;  
ii.  by exploring institutional structures that can facilitate local adaptation activities 
under accountable and transparent conditions;  
iii.  by improving knowledge on a) implementation measures (e.g. through 
demonstrations and pilot programmes), b) required technological innovations, c) 
capacity building, and d) scaling up of local initiatives (i.e., exchanging and 
replicating best practices). 
2.  Investments in human development: Beyond the above preparatory work, investment in 
basic human development − such as the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals − 
is  critical. It will build adaptive capacity and help provide a viable foundation for 
implementing adaptive responses. The extensive overlap between adaptation and human 
development makes it possible for past decades of development aid to provide directly 
transferable knowledge, approaches, institutions and lessons for adaptation activities today. 
Similarly, the many lessons learned with regard to risk reduction and disaster management 
should be applied to implementing adaptation activities in the immediate future.  
3.  Distinguishing adaptation from development?: Given the fundamental overlap between 
adaptation and human development, any adaptation instrument or mechanism that is 
premised on distinguishing ‘adaptation’ activities from ‘human development’ activities, for 
example by attempting to quantify the “incremental costs” of adaptation over the “baseline 
costs” of development, should be questioned. It is doubtful that a unambiguous accounting 
of incremental costs can work in practice.  
4.  Financing and implementation: Developed and developing countries should consider 
whether to discuss separately the question of financing (i.e., how to share the burden) and 
implementation (i.e. how the financial resources are used for developing country 
adaptation). The former will raise questions of responsibility, while the latter raises 
questions of adaptation needs and the capacity of given countries to effectively absorb the 
funds. 
5.  Informal dialogues: A greater number of informal dialogues on adaptation between 
developing and developed countries’ representatives should be created to build trust and 
increase understanding. Climate negotiators may also benefit from arrangements similar to 
those in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) process, whereby permanent ADAPTATION AS A STRATEGIC ISSUE IN THE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS | iii 
climate delegations would be set up in the same location, giving them ample time to work 
and interact between formal negotiating rounds. Another possibility is to convene a 
‘Climate Change Adaptation Forum’ − a venue for institutions and stakeholders that deal 
with adaptation. Many stakeholders, including those already active in the UNFCCC, NGOs, 
insurance sector actors, adaptation practitioners, local community representatives and 
academics could meet there to exchange information away from the contentious atmosphere 
of formal negotiations. As a first step, developed and developing countries could seek to 
establish what is and what is not currently negotiable on adaptation. This will help 
distinguish what can be fast-tracked from what will require a more gradual, step-by-step 
approach in terms of building consensus. 
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ADAPTATION AS A STRATEGIC ISSUE IN THE  
CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS 
A report by the European Climate Platform (ECP) 
Sivan Kartha, Preety Bhandari, Louise van Schaik, Deborah Cornland and Bo Kjellén 
1 Introduction 
Objective, scope and relevance for EU policymakers  
It is generally accepted that industrialised countries, including the member states of the 
European Union, bear a certain responsibility for causing climate change impacts in developing 
countries and should bear part of the costs of adaptation. It is also in their self-interest to do so. 
In this increasingly globalised world, insufficient adaptation in developing countries will affect 
industrialised countries, for example through a decline in world trade activity, an increase in the 
spread of disease, escalating disaster-relief expenditures, and increased migration flows. To the 
extent that countries might ultimately be held legally responsible for causing climate change in 
other countries, ignoring the issue might lead to legitimate claims for compensation in the 
future. Moreover, a global or near-global climate regime would be difficult to negotiate without 
an effective framework for addressing adaptation. This is because more support for adaptation is 
likely to be a condition for developing countries to participate in mitigation aspects of any 
future climate regime in a meaningful way.  
In this report we examine how countries throughout the world can adapt to climate change 
impacts by working together. This is a topic that has been rising in prominence on the agenda of 
the international climate change negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as well as in other international forums. 
2  Adaptation concepts  
International collaboration on climate change focuses mainly on mitigating greenhouse gas 
emissions. This is not surprising, if one considers the difference between adaptation and 
mitigation in terms of their public good characteristics. Given that the benefits of one country’s 
mitigation are shared with all countries, the need for international collaboration with regard to 
climate mitigation is clear. No country wants to be put at a competitive disadvantage by 
undertaking mitigation action alone. Moreover, any given country needs mitigation in other 
countries, or the climate problem will not be solved. And, since it does not matter to the climate 
system where GHG emissions are produced and reduced, international collaboration enables 
mitigation to occur more efficiently, by enabling reductions to occur where they are most cost-
effective. In contrast, the benefits of adaptation are felt most keenly at the local community 
level where the adaptation activities are undertaken. The global interdependency that is 
characteristic of mitigation is more indirect in the case of adaptation. The case for a global 
framework for addressing adaptation is more nuanced, based in the political context of the 
climate regime, the moral responsibility that societies have to each other, and that in a 
globalizing world each nation’s welfare is linked to every other’s.. 
2.1 Clarifying  the  meaning of ‘adaptation’  
The close link between climate change and sustainable development is now well established. 
Human-induced climate change will result in harmful impacts on agricultural and hydrological 
systems, forests, fisheries, health and economic infrastructure, and other natural and 2 | KARTHA, BHANDARI, VAN SCHAIK, CORNLAND & KJELLÉN 
socioeconomic resources. These impacts will exacerbate existing conditions of poverty, 
malnutrition and illness, thereby posing a threat to the achievement of development objectives, 
including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Conversely, the selection of 
development pathways will influence the GHG emission levels that affect future climate change 
and future capacity to mitigate and adapt.  
There is a growing understanding that, to be effective, adaptation efforts must address 
vulnerability as a central concept, i.e., resilience to stresses on economic, social, political and 
environmental systems (Smit & Pilifosova, 2001; Turner et al, 2003) In this report we adopt a 
comprehensive definition of adaptation that includes both efforts to implement adaptive 
responses (measures adopted in response to existing or anticipated climate impacts) and efforts 
to enhance adaptive capacity (the capacity to identify, assess, modify and implement effective 
adaptive responses without compromising future adaptive capacity).  
Adaptive responses should not been interpreted too narrowly. Localised, technology-based and 
infrastructure-focused interventions that anticipate a specific climate impact and are targeted at 
a specific sector are too limited for a number of reasons (Klein et al, 2005; Patt et al, 2005; 
Burton & van Aalst, 2004). First, the reliance on climate change projections makes the long-
term effectiveness of specific, localised adaptive responses subject to great uncertainty. Second, 
individual adaptive responses tend to be partial – often short-term – solutions. Third, when the 
definition of adaptation is limited to responses specific to climate change, it neglects the fact 
that vulnerability to climate change rarely occurs in isolation, but rather as a syndrome 
accompanied by other types of vulnerability. For example, it might help to provide a rural 
agricultural household that grows a particular subsistence crop with a more drought-resistant 
variety, but a more robust and comprehensive strategy would improve food security generally 
through, say, a set of coordinated measures that includes agricultural extension, crop 
diversification, integrated pest management practices and rainwater harvesting.  
The concept of building adaptive capacity is yet more fundamental and far-reaching. It 
recognises that it is not possible to anticipate the exact impacts of climate change or put in place 
precise defensive mechanisms to deal with them, nor the multiple other stresses that vulnerable 
communities face. It recognises that these combined stresses create a syndrome of vulnerability 
that can best be addressed through fundamental investments in building resilience. For example, 
the household is most capable of successfully adopting the set of food security measures 
mentioned above if it has a literate family member, can access investment capital through local 
financial institutions, is integrated into intact social networks, and if there is an open channel for 
conveying concerns and priorities to local decision-makers.  
The report entitled Poverty and Climate Change: Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor 
through Adaptation, issued by eleven bilateral and multilateral development agencies 
(Interagency Report, 2003), usefully summarises the keys to enhancing adaptive capacity:  
•  Supporting sustainable livelihoods by targeting development efforts at supporting 
communities’ efforts to enhance social capital, preserve and restore natural capital, 
secure appropriate physical capital, enhance human capital and secure financial capital; 
•  Ensuring equitable growth by fostering growth in areas of the economy that provide 
opportunities for increased employment and higher returns for poor people’s unique 
assets and contexts; 
•  Improving governance by making public institutions responsive, participative and 
accountable to those they serve in order to make decision-making processes and 
implementation activities robust and effective. ADAPTATION AS A STRATEGIC ISSUE IN THE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS | 3 
The nature of adaptive capacity is thus highly location-specific. Effectively enhancing adaptive 
capacity is heavily reliant on local knowledge and local involvement in design and 
implementation (Lim et al, 2005; Downing et al., 2005; Interagency Report, 2003). Indeed, 
“adaptation is largely a place-based activity, and a great deal of it can and should take place 
spontaneously or autonomously within those sectors and by those people, communities and 
enterprises most directly at risk” (Burton & van Aalst, 2004).  
This highly location-specific nature of adaptation does not mean that adaptation should be 
wholly local. Adaptation is a combination of implementation, which is largely undertaken at the 
local level, and facilitation, which involves roles for actors from local to national to 
international level. Facilitation includes creating an enabling environment in which the local 
implementation of adaptation is feasible. It also involves generating and sharing knowledge, 
building institutional capacity, carrying out coordination and management tasks and providing 
technological and financial resources.  
The link to human development is central to this understanding of the term ‘adaptation’. There 
is considerable overlap between efforts to enhance adaptive capacity and efforts to achieve 
broad human development goals. Like human development itself, effective adaptation will 
require not only improved understanding and more institutional capacity, but also significant 
financial resources. Box 1 provides some estimates of the resources required for ‘climate-
proofing’ capital investments. These estimates do not include a range of other adaptation costs, 
which may not be direct capital investments, but which are critical elements of adaptation 
nonetheless.  
 
 
 
Box 1 Estimates of adaptation needs in monetary terms 
•  The OECD examined the potential for mainstreaming adaptation into development assistance in 
six countries. The results showed that the bulk of this assistance was being provided to climate-
sensitive sectors. In Bangladesh and Egypt it was about $1-2 billion between 1998 and 2002, and 
in Nepal it was as high as 50-65% of development aid flowing into the country (Agrawala, 2003). 
•  Taking into account the costs required to ‘climate-proof’ investments (ODA, foreign direct 
investments and domestic investment), the World Bank recently estimated the costs of this 
component of adaptation in developing countries could range between US $10 billion and $40 
billion annually (World Bank, 2006a).  
•  The total amount of resources committed to adaptation (and other related preparatory activities) 
through UNFCCC channels has come to less than $0.4 billion cumulatively over roughly the last 
ten years. In contrast, global ODA flows amount to some $100 billion per year, foreign direct 
investments in developing countries amount to some $160 billion per year and gross domestic 
investment in developing countries amount to some $1,500 billion per year (World Bank, 2006a). 
The question is whether adaptation will be prioritise enough  to mobilise resources of a scale that 
enables adaptation to be mainstreamed into these other channels. Adaptation efforts can most 
effectively have an impact by altering and leveraging these much larger flows. If, in contrast, all 
adaptation were undertaken only as discrete measures isolated from the much larger flows that are 
associated with ODA, foreign direct investment and domestic investment, then these flows would 
continue to proceed without adequate regard to climate adaptation needs.  4 | KARTHA, BHANDARI, VAN SCHAIK, CORNLAND & KJELLÉN 
3  Current status of adaptation efforts 
Initially, the UNFCCC was focused primarily on mitigation. Adaptation was considered less 
urgent as it was initially assumed that significant climate change impacts would not be evident 
for some decades. Today, the international negotiations appear to be looking at all the issues in 
the context of the four main strands identified for the dialogue on “long-term cooperative action 
to address climate change” launched at COP11 in December 2005: sustainable development, 
technology, adaptation and market opportunities. In reality, however, much of the negotiation 
effort and emphasis is still on mitigation, and burden sharing is currently discussed only in the 
context of mitigation. Some analysts have informally observed that the adaptation regime is a 
decade behind the mitigation regime. They say that adaptation is at a comparatively embryonic 
stage characterised by institutional development, knowledge generation and preparation, which 
have to take place before on-the-ground progress can be made in communities suffering from 
climate impacts.  
3.1  Adaptation in the existing climate regime 
To the extent that adaptation efforts were initially envisioned in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), they were embodied in the first meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP1) guidance to the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) to initiate a three stage process of short-, medium-, and long-term support for adaptation. 
At present, the existing climate regime is channelling some resources toward adaptation through 
these initial GEF channels, as well as the three funds under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol: the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF), and the Adaptation Fund.
2 Most of the resources result from a pledge made by the EU 
and other industrialised countries in 2001 when developing country support was needed to 
“keep Kyoto alive”.
3 The resources committed through this pledge are channelled through the 
GEF, bilateral and multilateral ODA, and the three funds. The fact that these resources are 
provided through diverse channels (including ‘additional’ ODA and the proceeds from the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) levy) makes it difficult to ascertain whether the 
pledging countries have met their 2005 commitments and are on track to meeting their 2006 
commitments. Deriving financing from these diverse sources and for multiple purposes also 
makes it difficult to ascertain what proportion of the funds is in fact allocated to adaptation 
activities. For further details on the pledge, see Appendix 1. For further details on the funds, see 
Appendix 2.  
Increased attention to adaptation since COP8 in New Delhi culminated in the adoption of a 
Five-Year Programme of Work on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change at 
COP11 in Montreal. This five-year work programme for the SBSTA (Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice) is intended “… to improve understanding and assessment 
of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, and to make informed decisions on practical adaptation 
actions and measures …”
 4 It left unspecified whether this five-year effort is focused exclusively 
on advancing knowledge (i.e. stocktaking, assessments, sharing of experiences, methodological 
                                                      
2 Decision 7/CP.7 and decision 10/CP.7, respectively. 
3 The EU plus Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland have pledged $410 million (€450 
million at July 2001 exchange rates) per year by 2005 in climate change funding for developing countries 
(see also Appendix 1). 
4 Decision 2/CP.11 taken at COP 11 (reported in FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1, 30 March 2006) 
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development, data management and dissemination, etc.), or whether it allows for 
implementation of concrete adaptation measures.  
The COP decision adopting the five-year programme specifies several “implementation 
modalities” that do not entail the implementation of concrete adaptation measures, although the 
decision does leave room for the adoption of additional modalities that could include 
implementation. This issue was heavily debated at COP11 and at the ensuing SBSTA24 in May 
2006, which was given the task of further developing the modalities of the five-year 
programme, consistent with the SBSTA mandate as an advisory body. The developing countries 
argued strongly in favour of an action-oriented approach that emphasises practical 
implementation and learning-by-doing. The course of the debates on the five-year programme 
closely mirrored the discussions surrounding the other sources of adaptation funding (GEF, 
SCC Fund, LDC Fund, Adaptation Fund) and resources for adaptation under the UNFCC 
Convention and Kyoto Protocol generally. It is worth noting that when the COP first introduced 
the Five Year Programme of Work (in Decision 1/CP.10), it also decided that the GEF should 
support implementation of pilot or demonstration projects (1/CP.10 7(b)(v) along with several 
other capacity building and knowledge enhancing activities. 
Until recently, the GEF had no explicit Operational Programme on adaptation, and its 
adaptation activities were secondary to its existing focal areas, which target global 
environmental benefits rather than locally needed adaptation. The three Marrakech funds are 
more directly targeted at adaptation activities, but the SCCF and the LDCF are funded through 
discretionary pledges, and the Adaptation Fund is subject to the uncertainty of the scale of the 
CDM and the market value of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs).
5  
The above points suggest that adaptation is an underdeveloped and fragmented part of the 
climate regime. The feeling, especially among developing countries, is that despite the 
widespread instances of climate impacts now being witnessed, the COP has not yet created 
sufficient elements of the climate regime aimed at implementing adaptation. One explanation 
offered for this situation is that the past decade has been a period of preparation. Implementation 
on the ground can only take place once this preparation has been done. Another reason is the 
small level of resources. Contributions to adaptation funding to date have been voluntary, have 
not been directly tied to any particular underlying rationale, measurement of obligations or 
indicator of needs and have thus been small in relation to the scale of the challenge. This is 
despite the fact that, by ratifying the UNFCCC, signatories have accepted a legally-binding 
commitment (within Article 4 of the UNFCCC, Article 11 of the Kyoto Protocol and in the 
Marrakech Accords) to provide financial resources in support of adaptation. Today, investment 
in adaptation per se is a minute fraction of the estimated need (see Box 1). The question remains 
as to whether adaptation funding based on voluntary pledges and a CDM levy can grow to the 
scale that is consistent with the adaptation challenge, and if not, then what type of framework 
would facilitate funding on the scale that is needed. 
3.2  Bringing adaptation into mainstream development thinking 
Given that adaptation is intrinsically linked to the broader development agenda, efforts to 
address adaptation can only be successful if they are integrated into mainstream development 
                                                      
5 It has also frequently been pointed out that the Adaptation Fund surcharge on the CDM is, ironically, a 
tax on developing country Parties insofar as it reduces both the volume of CERs traded (in favour of 
domestic reductions, emissions trading and Joint Implementation) and the revenue available for the Clean 
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thinking. While such integration
6 has long been accepted in the case of mitigation, the same 
realisation has only dawned slowly when it comes to adaptation (Klein, 2006).  
Although not much has happened in the recent past in terms of integrating adaptation into ODA 
(Agrawala et al, 2003 a-d; McGuigan et al, 2002; Burton & van Aalst, 2004; Klein et al, 2005; 
Klein, 2001), it is now emerging as something that policymakers widely agree on. This was 
demonstrated at the recent meeting of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the 
Environment Policy Committee in April 2006, where the development and environment 
ministers of the OECD nations adopted a Declaration on Integrating Climate Change 
Adaptation into Development Cooperation.
7 The key element of the ministers’ declaration was a 
commitment “to better integrate climate change adaptation in development planning and 
assistance”. Simultaneously, the OECD development and environment ministers issued a 
Framework for Common Action Around Shared Goals, which reaffirms that threats to the 
environment have serious implications for poverty reduction and seeks to improve the 
coherence of efforts by Development Co-operation and Environmental agencies in OECD 
countries in support of poverty reduction and the MDGs. The OECD is currently carrying out a 
survey on how development agencies incorporate climate change into their activities. The first 
results of this survey are due by the end of 2006. 
In a recent report, the World Bank (2006b) stated that it will focus on enhancing risk 
management approaches to enable development institutions and their partner countries to better 
address the growing risks from climate change and, at the same time, make current development 
investments more resilient to climate variability and extreme weather events. Many 
development agencies and NGOs (such as the Red Cross) are investing in efforts to learn from 
their long-standing experience with risk and crisis management of disasters in developing 
countries, including those caused by extreme weather events, so that they can apply this 
knowledge to climate adaptation . An overview of key questions on mainstreaming adaptation 
into the ODA system is given in Appendix 3. 
Ultimately, the purpose of integrating adaptation into development decision-making is to 
prevent climate change from being separated from the other stresses and trends that affect 
development as experienced by vulnerable citizens. However, it is important to note that 
development is primarily driven by the vast majority of investments that are not part of ODA. 
As Box 1 shows, non-ODA foreign and domestic investment is more than an order of 
magnitude larger than ODA. Integrating adaptation into mainstream development, therefore, 
will ultimately need those much larger non-ODA investments to be guided by decision-making 
that accounts for climate stresses as well. This ambitious objective implies not just a change in 
thinking, but changes in terms of institutional capacity, knowledge and human and financial 
resources.  
                                                      
6 It is widely accepted that energy-based reductions can be effective only when mainstreamed into energy 
policy through comprehensive, sector-wide measures such as, for example, carbon taxes, renewable 
portfolio requirements and efficiency standards. 
7 Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Co-operation Adopted by 
Development and Environment Ministers of OECD Member Countries at the Meeting of the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee and the Environment Policy Committee, 4 April 2006, OECD 
Headquarters, Paris, France (www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/29/36426943.pdf). The ministerial declaration 
recognises that “responses to climate change should be co-ordinated with social and economic 
development in an integrated manner, taking into account the legitimate priority needs of developing 
countries for the achievement of sustainable economic growth and the eradication of poverty”. ADAPTATION AS A STRATEGIC ISSUE IN THE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS | 7 
3.3  EU views and projects on adaptation in developing countries  
EU thinking on adaptation has been progressing, especially in the past year. Adaptation has 
been referred to in several EU policy documents, including the 2005 Commission 
Communication entitled ‘Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change’, the ‘Sustainable 
Development Strategy’ and the ‘EU Consensus for Development’. Generally, concrete 
commitments to undertake adaptation activities, and particularly to do so in developing 
countries have been lacking. Some attention to adaptation in developing countries was given in 
the March 2003 Communication entitled ‘Climate Change in the Context of Development Co-
operation’. It contained a long list of actions, many of which focused on adaptation and led to 
the Council of the EU adopting an Action Plan on Climate Change in the Context of 
Development Cooperation
8 in the autumn of 2004. This action plan contains several provisions 
under the heading of ‘support for adaptation’ but has not yet included financial commitments. 
An evaluation of the action plan is due by the end of 2006.
9 
Further Commission activities include two bilateral workshops on adaptation with China and 
India, organised for the autumn of 2006. These workshops are primarily of a technical nature 
with a focus on sharing experiences in implementing adaptation projects. Adaptation has also 
received attention in the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP),
10 which dedicated one 
working group to the theme (although the principal focus was on adaptation inside the EU rather 
than collaboration with developing countries). In December 2006, the European Commission 
will host a conference at which it will launch a Green Paper on Adaptation to Climate Change to 
kick-off debate and consultation. As with the ECCP, focus will be on adaptation within the EU. 
Nevertheless, insights may emerge from the EU-based adaptation discussion that will be 
applicable to adaptation in developing countries. A clear pointer in this respect is the recently 
adopted Council conclusions which contain the EU’s position for COP12/MOP2. They devote 
considerable attention to adaptation in developing countries, suggesting the issue has risen on 
the list of EU priorities
11. In particular they highlight “the need to finalise the five-year 
programme of work on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change to enable early 
implementation of agreed activities” and “the importance of reaching agreement on the 
governance of the Adaptation Fund and of making it operational as soon as possible in 
supporting concrete adaptation projects and programmes”
12. Another pointer may be the 
forthcoming post-2012 Commission Communication, expected in early 2007.  
In terms of funding, it continues to be generally difficult to identify what sums have been 
allocated to adaptation, as projects funded by the European Development Fund or directly from 
the Community budget do not specify adaptation as a separate category. Nor is there an 
appropriate overview of activities geared towards adaptation in developing countries undertaken 
by the individual EU member states. 
Generally, attention to adaptation within Europe and to the issue of integrating climate change 
into mainstream development cooperation is rising within EU member states. For example, 
                                                      
8 See for an analysis of decision-making in the EU Council on the Action plan Van Schaik (2006) and 
Hudson (2006).  
9 EU member states and the European Commission are currently discussing the terms of reference for this 
evaluation.  
10 The ECCP is a Commission-sponsored multi-stakeholder dialogue, serving as background for policy-
making. 
11 Agence Europe – Bulletin Quotidien Europe, No. 9293, Wednesday 25 October.  
12 Climate Change – Council Conclusions, press release of the 2757
th Council Meeting, Environment, 
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Denmark has launched a project on integrating climate change into mainstream development 
cooperation activities, including the development of a tool kit.
13 Several other member states 
have similar activities. In July 2006, the Finnish EU Presidency supported a conference on 
living with climate variability.
14 The upcoming German EU Presidency in the first half of 2007 
will support a conference on climate change adaptation and the European water dimension.
15   
4  An adaptation regime: Looking forward 
Given the magnitude of the climate change challenge ahead, both local and international 
resources will be needed in the future to cover costs related to building adaptive capacity and 
implementing adaptive responses in developing countries. This will inevitably entail transfers 
from industrialised to developing countries. A key question is how to obtain the level of 
political acceptability needed to create and expand the financial resources required to support 
developing country adaptation efforts (Parry et al, 2005). Various explanations can be put 
forward as to why the EU and other industrialised parties would choose to provide substantial 
resources for implementing adaptation in developing countries.  
First, there is a political argument for funding adaptation as a means of engaging developing 
countries. It is thought that extending meaningful adaptation assistance to developing countries 
will help to encourage them to participate in mitigation aspects of the climate regime as well. 
Developing countries have unambiguously staked out a position that they are entitled to funding 
for adaptation and that it should be provided by industrialised countries, and that without this 
funding a more substantive form of participation in the mitigation aspects of the regime would 
be unlikely. Indeed, little further progress in international negotiations can be expected without 
taking these concerns into account (Ott et al., 2004).  
The second explanation, like the first, is also based on enlightened self-interest. This argument 
justifies industrialised countries funding adaptation as a means of ensuring that developing 
countries remain viable partners for economic growth, global governance and international 
security. Climate change without proactive adaptation could arguably cause significant damage 
to the economies and governance systems of developing countries, and perhaps ultimately 
generate a flow of environmental refugees.
16  
The third explanation has its origins in the ethical and legal context in which the debate about 
climate change is unfolding. It argues that industrialised countries have a responsibility to 
contribute resources towards adaptation in developing countries. It is discussed in considerably 
more detail in the following section, as (a) it carries the greatest sense of inevitability as a 
motivator of EU investment in developing country adaptation, (b) it may offer some quantitative 
measure of the obligation industrialised parties may have to fund adaptation in developing 
countries, and (c) it helps in the development of a fundamental principle around which a future 
adaptation regime can be envisioned.  
                                                      
13 For an overview of the Danish activities, see: http://www.climate.dccd.cursum.net. 
14 See: http://www.livingwithclimate.fi/en/en_18.html 
15 See: http://www.climate-water-adaptation-berlin2007.org  
16 See, for example, Byravan and Rajan, 2005. “Immigration could ease climate-change impact” Nature. 
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4.1  Fundamental characteristics of adaptation 
Building on the earlier sections of this background document, this section sets out three 
fundamental characteristics of adaptation that provide a framework within which proposals for a 
future adaptation regime can be considered.  
4.1.1  The link to human development  
The first fundamental principle derives from the intrinsic connection between effective 
adaptation and human development. As discussed in Section 2, adaptation must include both 
adaptive responses and efforts to increase adaptive capacity. The most effective adaptation 
strategy in the long-term is to provide secure livelihoods, foster equitable economic growth and 
improve governance. As articulated in the Interagency report (2003), “adaptation requires the 
development of human capital, strengthening of institutional systems, and sound management of 
public finances and natural resources. Such processes build the resilience of countries, 
communities and households to all shocks and stresses, including climate variability and 
change, and are good development practice in themselves”.  
If an adaptation regime is to induce the most effective adaptation, then a major component of its 
objective must be identifying and promoting those activities that can most effectively enable 
and accelerate these “good development practices”.  
4.1.2  Responsibility for climate change and climate impacts 
The second characteristic relates to the scale of the adaptation challenge, not just in terms of 
creating institutions and generating knowledge, but in terms of additional costs that will have to 
be borne, either to make adaptation possible or to compensate damages. (see Box 1.) The need 
for such resources inevitably raises the question of the responsibility of nations for causing 
climate change and, in turn, damages caused by this climate change. As Baer (2006) writes: 
“That it is wrong to harm others (or risk harming them) for one’s own gain, and that one owes 
compensation if one does such harm, is as close to a universal ethical principle as exists. It is a 
principle that is justified in all kinds of ethical or moral frameworks, from divine revelation to 
deontological ethics to social contract theory and others. It is in fact a prime example of what 
some philosophers call common (or commonsense) morality.”  
Over time this common moral principle has become firmly encoded in national case law and 
legal reasoning with respect to environmental pollution within national boundaries. International 
law, too, echoes this same principle. The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 declares in the famous 
Principle 21 (reaffirmed in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration) that states have “the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” and 
reiterates in Principle 22 that “States shall cooperate to develop further the international law 
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental 
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond 
their jurisdiction” (UN Conference on the Human Environment, 1972). 
The UNFCCC, however, specifically avoids establishing legal responsibility for climate 
damage,
17 although it does potentially lay the basis for recognising state-based responsibility in 
                                                      
17 As Tol and Verheyen (2004) discuss, the industrialised nations successfully resisted any codification of 
state-based responsibility for compensation for climate damages at the time of the UNFCCC negotiations. 
In response, and in anticipation of the future evolution of the climate regime or legal action, several 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) states issued a declaration that “…signature of the Convention 
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a manner that is reiterated in the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords. UNFCCC Annex 
II countries are obligated to assist developing countries in meeting adaptation costs under 
specific circumstances (as expressed in Articles 4.3, 4.4, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.11). In particular, Article 
4.3 commits UNFCCC Annex II countries to “provide new and additional resources to meet the 
agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures…” including “preparing for the 
adaptation to the impacts of climate change”. In addition, Article 4.4 states that UNFCCC 
Annex II countries “shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those 
adverse effects”. Some have interpreted this latter clause as “an implicit acceptance of 
responsibility for causing climate change” but this has not been unambiguously established.
18 
The Kyoto Protocol (Article 11) further requires that the “implementation of these existing 
commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of 
funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among developed country Parties”. 
4.1.3   Facilitating and implementing local solutions 
The third fundamental characteristic is the fact that effective adaptation, like human 
development itself, is ultimately a highly localised process that defies generic solutions. 
Vulnerable communities and households suffer from constellations of stresses with complex and 
location-specific interactions, and the interventions that build resilience tend to be similarly 
location-specific. As discussed in section 2, effective adaptation therefore requires both 
facilitation and implementation of location-specific efforts to adapt to environmental change.  
While implementation of adaptation is largely undertaken at the local level, facilitation relies on 
actors at local to national to international levels. Generating and sharing knowledge across these 
scales is challenging. Even more challenging is to mobilise resources and distribute them to 
local levels. But successful strategies have evolved over time within the development 
community. These tend to be participatory, stakeholder-driven undertakings. They are often 
based on the close involvement of local civil society organisations, place strong value on local 
information and knowledge, and invest a lot in building local trust in and acceptance of the 
undertakings as well as building durable links between the different levels (Lim et al, 2005, for 
example). As explained in the Interagency Report (2003), “In Southern Africa numerous 
adaptation techniques are used by poorer farmers to deal with anticipated drought. These 
include water and soil management techniques, resistant crop varieties and food production 
methods. However, these techniques are often known only locally, or to certain ethnic groups.”  
The challenge then for an adaptation regime is to move between the local, regional and national 
levels and effectively channel knowledge and resources to the local sites where they are needed 
for the implementation of adaptation. 
4.2  Commitments to support effective adaptation? 
As the impacts of climate change become more keenly felt in the coming years, adaptation is 
likely to continue to rise in prominence within the UNFCCC dialogue. However, it remains 
                                                                                                                                                            
responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change…” Such a clause was in fact unsuccessfully 
proposed for inclusion in the UNFCCC text itself (see submissions of Vanuatu on behalf of AOSIS, 
Elements for a Framework Convention on climate change, in a set of informal papers provided by 
delegations, related to the preparation of a framework convention on climate change, UN Doc. 
A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add3). 
18 Tol and Verheyen (2004) quoting Sands, P., 1992, “The United Nations Framework Convention on 
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unclear how adaptation will be addressed within the UNFCCC. A regime that successfully 
manages to support adaptation will face the three challenges implied above: (i) to respect the 
close link between adaptation and development, (ii) to create an acceptable framework for 
recognising responsibility for generating adaptation funds, and (iii) to develop instruments that 
support the objectives of facilitating and implementing local adaptation activities via good 
coordination between the local, regional and national levels. 
Importantly, before any legally binding commitments are accepted, an adaptation regime will 
need to inspire a high level of confidence that adaptation will be supported in a manner that is 
effective and efficient. Securing adaptation funding will not be easy, and, without significant 
assurances that resources would be efficiently and equitably allocated to adaptation activities, 
those funds will not be forthcoming. Indeed, seeking to mobilise the resources at too early a 
stage would be a mistake. The notions of effectiveness and efficiency cover several elements: 
1.  Efficient institutions and mechanisms, which allow resources to contribute directly to 
adaptation without their being wasted on bureaucracy or diverted due to corruption.  
2.  Assurance that resources are being put towards bona fide adaptation activities rather 
than activities that would be taking place anyway. 
3.  Governance structures that enable equitable decision-making and instil trust in the 
governments providing resources, the governments requiring resources, and the 
communities who are in need of adaptation. 
4.  Sufficient absorptive capacity of developing countries make effective use of adaptation 
funding will need to be established. In many countries, this does not exist today and will 
not exist without improvements in knowledge and expertise, institutional strength, good 
governance, and transparency and accountability.  
5.  A specific legal instrument for adaptation must not ‘ghettoise’ adaptation, and make it 
harder, rather than easier, to ultimately integrate adaptation into mainstream 
development activities (as well as other multilateral environmental agreements and 
trade agreements). 
With these points in mind, we now consider each of the three fundamental characteristics of 
adaptation in turn with respect to their ramifications for an adaptation regime.  
1.  The link to human development 
In today’s regime, UNFCCC Annex II countries have sought some assurance that the money 
they provide is going towards new activities in developing countries rather than ‘business as 
usual’ activities directed towards existing development objectives.
19 One can anticipate that this 
concern with “additionality” will only grow more pressing if the climate regime progresses 
beyond the current stage in which commitments to finance adaptation efforts are voluntary and 
contributions are donated under the banner of philanthropy, and evolves into a regime in which 
Parties accept legally-binding commitments to contribute resources towards adaptation. 
However, given that a major objective of an adaptation regime is to build adaptive capacity, 
which entails investments in fundamental improvements in livelihoods, equitable growth and 
democratic governance, then it might prove counterproductive if UNFCCC Annex II countries 
cling to the additionality construct with respect to adaptation activities. Firstly, as argued in 
section 2, it will be genuinely difficult to distinguish many adaptation activities per se from 
                                                      
19 The most explicit example of this is the CDM in which mitigation must be ‘additional’ to ongoing 
technological and sectoral change. In the adaptation realm, it manifests itself as the requirement for 
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broad-based development activities in general. Secondly, attempts to demonstrate additionality 
would be likely to direct attention towards those adaptation activities that may be the most 
easily discernible as additional, but not necessarily the most important urgent, or cost-effective 
contributors to adaptive capacity. This phenomenon – sometimes referred to as the “paradox of 
additionality” (Sugiyama and Michaelowa, 2001) − favours separate and immediate project-
based activities, often focused on well-defined marginal improvements to localised 
infrastructure rather than broad-based and long-term activities that may much more effectively 
address the underlying drivers of vulnerability and build adaptive capacity. 
2.  Responsibility 
In order to generate sufficient funding for adaptation or, in the words of the Convention, to 
ensure ‘adequacy and predictability’ and ‘appropriate burden sharing’ in funding adaptation, the 
climate discussion will have to evolve from general acknowledgement of ethical and legal 
principles to specific definitions of responsibility and their quantification. One example of   
fairly concrete methods is the a typology of quantitative indicators of responsibility recently 
produced by the World Resources Institute (Baumert & Markoff, 2003).
20 As adaptation funding 
requirements are assessed, with due account taken of the magnitude of anticipated climate 
change impacts, the obligation to provide funding would then be allocated to Parties according 
to an agreed definition of responsibility
21. 
There should be no illusions that a discussion of responsibility will be easy. Industrialised 
Parties will continue to be extraordinarily wary of any obligations that commit them to 
providing significant additional adaptation funds. Moreover, it would be unwise to establish any 
system to generate significantly more financial resources for adaptation before there is 
substantial progress on how those resources would be deployed. Yet initiating the discussion 
will still be useful. It would encourage industrialised country Parties to articulate very clearly 
the conditions under which they could be confident that adaptation resources would be used 
effectively. More generally, it would advance the global dialogue, which began at the global 
climate change summits in Stockholm and Rio de Janiero, on responsibility for trans-boundary 
environmental impacts.  
3.  Local solutions with accountability 
Any attempt to use adaptation funds to facilitate and implement dispersed and fragmented 
activity at the local level will bring with it the challenge of addressing the need for transparent 
management and accountability. It will be necessary to ensure accountability to those providing 
the funding as well as to the recipient communities. Industrialised countries will not willingly 
fulfil their responsibilities to provide resources for adaptation if the recipient countries do not 
also transparently uphold their responsibility to efficiently and effectively undertake the 
intended adaptation. An adaptation regime involving legally-binding commitments would 
therefore need to allow for oversight and ensure accountability, while avoiding micro-
management and keeping decision-making authority and discretion within the host countries 
and communities. 
                                                      
20 Negotiating an acceptable indicator of responsibility will be challenging. Parties can be expected 
initially to put forward proposals that favour their interests, and rationalise them as “appropriate burden 
sharing” in keeping with “their common but differentiated responsibilities”. In addition, Parties may need 
to resolve issues such as the attribution of emissions to importers or exporters and the distinction between 
‘luxury’ and ‘subsistence’ emissions. One method, for example, is the early proposal put forward by 
AOSIS to fund an International Climate Fund, which equally considers a Party’s emissions and GDP in 
assigning national contributions (AOSIS, 1991).   
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The balance of control between the Party providing the funds and the Party (or community) 
receiving the funds will be a challenging one to strike. From the perspective of the Party 
providing the funds, relinquishing any control may be unappealing and may undermine their 
willingness to accept an adaptation regime. On the other hand, from the perspective of the Party 
receiving the funds, these funds may be considered obligatory payments as a result of ongoing 
climate change damage caused by the Parties that emit high levels of pollution, and thus control 
should rightfully be in the hands of the recipient. The basic tension is between an implicit 
charity mentality versus a perspective of compensation or liability.  
4.3  Options for achieving adequate adaptation  
Below we set out a few of the primary types of financial delivery channels that have been put 
forward as options within the climate regime
22 for achieving adaptation, and consider each in 
the context of the three fundamental principles raised in section 4.1.  
Option 1: Expand ODA infrastructure to accommodate the required adaptation  
One option for achieving adaptation is to internalise adaptation in the existing bilateral and 
multilateral ODA infrastructure. Resources would be provided to ODA agencies, which would 
be responsible for administering the undertaking of adaptation in developing countries.
23 
Although not all developing countries receive ODA, and this is not the only source of financing 
going from industrialised countries to developing countries, it is nevertheless an important 
source, specifically for those countries heavily reliant on ODA. 
The link to development 
Given the close link between building adaptive capacity and development, ODA agencies are a 
rather natural option for addressing adaptation. The ODA system should hold much transferable 
knowledge and applicable infrastructure for adaptation. One clear challenge is that ODA has so 
far not yet successfully internalised climate change. It is just beginning to undertake the process 
of mainstreaming adaptation and mitigation into ODA practices.
 24 
Responsibility 
One possibility is an ODA-based adaptation regime in which industrialised countries are 
assigned adaptation commitments according to some indicator of responsibility, which they then 
discharge by investing specified amounts in adaptation activities through their own (or other) 
ODA agencies. Such commitments would need to be of a scale that is consistent with the 
challenge, and that would ensure ‘adequacy and predictability’ and ‘appropriate burden sharing’ 
in funding adaptation. 
One can expect considerable debate as to the extent to which commitments would be new and 
additional to already existing ODA flows, or merely a relabeling of existing development 
activities. Here again the tension between considering adaptation funding as charity or as 
compensation comes to the fore. 
 
                                                      
22 One can imagine a climate regime that incorporates various different manifestations or combinations of 
these prototypical options. It is even conceivable that a portfolio of options exists that could emerge in a 
piecemeal manner rather than be implemented through a formal international climate regime. 
23 Note, whether or not ODA is the primary channel for delivering adaptation, in order to remain effective 
under a changing climate, it will nonetheless have to mainstream adaptation. 
24 See Appendix 3 for a brief outline of questions that would need to be addressed in order to make 
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Local solutions with accountability 
The ODA system has become increasingly capable, over the years, of internalising ‘bottom-up’, 
locally-appropriate responses. Given the difficulty of implementing this successfully, it is still 
maturing in this area and still has its serious critics. One difficulty is that ODA is based on a 
donor model: resources are provided voluntarily by donor countries, which maintain a high 
degree of control over the quantity of funds, the choice of recipient countries, the selection of 
local counterparts and the content of the projects they support. The need to embrace local 
solutions would require that significant adjustments be made, to bring in local voices and confer 
a greater deal of autonomy to the recipient countries and communities (Müller, 2006a, 2006b).  
Option 2: Create or extend a globally centralised fund 
A single, centralised entity could be created or extended to channel global adaptation resources, 
just as such an entity has been considered the natural home of the Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto 
Protocol. There has been an active debate regarding the suitability of such an entity as the 
manager of the Adaptation Fund. Generally speaking, industrialised countries have favoured the 
GEF as the managing entity, while developing countries have favoured an entity modelled on 
the governance structure of the Montreal Protocol Fund, which would keep authority within the 
COP. Developing countries, particularly smaller developing countries and Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), have expressed concern about GEF procedures (which might or might not 
apply to the Adaptation Fund), such as the formulation underlying the Resource Allocation 
Framework (which seems to favour large and rapidly growing countries) and the application of 
incremental costs and global environmental benefits to adaptation projects (UNFCCC, 2006; 
Muller, 2006a; 2006b; UNFCCC, 2006). 
The link to development 
Large, centralised entities with a development mandate currently exist, and work with varying 
degrees of success. A centralised entity might be more effective at ancillary activities, such as 
capacity building, institutional strengthening and technology transfer.  
Responsibility 
If a system were in place to assign funding commitments to individual Parties based on 
responsibility, it would be straightforward to couple those commitments to the replenishment of 
a centralised global fund.  
Local solutions with accountability 
There is some experience with global, centralised funds supporting highly locally-based 
activities. For example, the GEF Small Grants Programme focuses on assisting civil society 
activities, although it is a small portion of its work. Accountability to local communities who 
are the intended recipients of adaptation resources would need to be more fully developed. 
Option 3: Create locally-focused funds such as Autonomous Adaptation Funds  
The concept of autonomous development funds would leave significant authority in the hands of 
local agencies and communities.
25 This idea, which was launched in the 1990s in an African 
context, could be particularly attractive for adaptation. The objective would be to establish 
                                                      
25 For a discussion, see for example: African Association for Public Administration and Management 
AAPAM, Nairobi, and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden under the title 
“Autonomous Development Funds in Africa. Report of the Expert Consultation on the role of 
Autonomous Funds as intermediaries in channeling money for social and economic development in 
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funds at national/sub-national levels to respond to local adaptation needs. The funds would 
receive grants from Parties consistent with their commitments to contribute to adaptation 
funding and potentially from other sources as well (multilateral and bilateral ODA, International 
Funding Instruments (IFIs), NGOs, local contributions). They would, to a large extent, be 
governed and managed locally, close to the recipients. Such funds could provide non-
bureaucratic and efficient support for concrete action. A similar construct, which was put in 
place in various Latin American states as a way of minimising the negative impacts of structural 
adjustment programmes in the 1990s (and continues to operate today), has also been identified 
as a viable mechanism for achieving adaptation (Cruz, 2005). 
The link to development 
Autonomous development funds are development-focused by their very nature.  
Responsibility 
If a system were in place to assign funding commitments to individual Parties based on 
responsibility, it is not difficult to imagine how it could be coupled to a system of autonomous 
development funds. One complication would be to coordinate what proportion of the total 
developed Parties’ funding commitment was allocated to each country or region. 
Local solutions with accountability 
By design, autonomous development funds are structured to provide ‘bottom-up’, locally-driven 
activities. A superstructure may be needed at the global level to assist in learning, technology 
transfer and other activities for which some degree of coordination is helpful. Given the high 
level of local control, this option would require innovative thinking on control and accounting 
procedures to reassure the Parties providing adaptation funding.  
Option 4: An insurance mechanism for adaptation 
Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC and Article 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol specifically call on 
UNFCCC Annex II Parties to consider actions, “including insurance”, to meet the specific 
needs and concerns of developing countries in adapting to climate change. More detailed 
examination is currently going into this idea. 
Insurance is not a well-defined concept in climate change discourse and has been used in 
different ways by different authors. Some refer primarily to market-based financial instruments 
for pooling risk among a population of firms or individuals who can afford the premiums (Mills 
& Lecomte, 2006). Others refer primarily to a mechanism whereby UNFCCC Annex II parties 
compensate developing countries suffering catastrophic impacts of climate change, such as 
floods caused by rising sea levels
26 (Germanwatch, 2005; AOSIS, 1991). Others consider hybrid 
mechanisms that may combine some subsidies from UNFCCC Annex II parties with innovative 
market-based insurance instruments (Bals et al, 2005; Linnerooth-Bayer & Mechler, 2006).  
Many questions arise from this range of options. Here are some particularly germane ones:  
a.  How would the insurance scheme be funded? Insurance mechanisms must have a net 
inward flow (premiums plus external subsidies and net investment income must be 
greater than total claims) and premiums can in fact be considerably greater than the 
claims paid out (e.g., by a factor of three for the Caribbean region (Linnerooth-Bayer 
and Mechler. 2006)). Affordability for poor communities and households is thus an 
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issue. In some cases, cross-subsidies have been worked into insurance schemes to make 
them affordable to the poorest (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler. 2006). 
b.  Given that some sort of subsidy will be required to insure much of the world’s 
vulnerable population, how would one avoid crowding out commercial insurance 
schemes where they may be appropriate? 
c.  How would one integrate an insurance mechanism (which provides compensation for 
damage) with adaptation?
27 To be effective and avoid perverse effects, the insurance 
mechanism would have to be designed so as to avoid the moral hazard risk of 
diminishing the incentive to undertake adaptation. It is important to note that a timely 
and adequate response to impacts is itself an adaptation measure, in that it enables a 
rapid recovery and thereby decreases indirect damages. 
d.  How would claims be assessed and payments delivered? As with disaster relief, there 
must be an infrastructure in place for assessing losses and transferring payments. The 
infrastructure must not suffer from excessively high transaction costs, corruption or 
inefficiency.  
e.  How would insurance schemes deal with ‘uninsurable’ losses? Insurance generally 
applies to risks that can be reliably estimated but for which there is uncertainty with 
regard to timing and consequences. Very gradual and predictable risks, such as sea-level 
rise and desertification, are generally considered uninsurable (Linnerooth-Bayer, 
Mechler, 2006). 
Despite these challenging questions, there are insurance schemes now being put in place (e.g. in 
Malawi, India, Turkey, Mexico, (Bals, 2005; Linnerooth-Bayer, 2006)) for various forms of 
catastrophic and weather-related risks, from which lessons are being learned. Given the 
difficulty of distinguishing climate change impacts from those of natural variability, insurance 
approaches might only be workable if they cover both. Building adaptive capacity, or reducing 
disaster risk, could be encouraged by requiring recipient countries to put in place relevant 
measures to qualify for coverage, or, if they are sharing in the costs, by offering discounted 
‘premiums’ to those with rigorous adaptation strategies (Ministerial Indaba, 2006).  
The link to development 
In general, insurance proposals focus on compensation for damage rather than adaptation. Some 
proposals explicitly refer to requiring developing countries to implement certain adaptation 
measures in order to qualify for insurance coverage, but none discuss in much detail the nature 
of adaptation cooperation and the linkage to development-focused efforts to build adaptive 
capacity.  
Responsibility 
Some of the proposed schemes (AOSIS, 1991; Germanwatch, 2005) explicitly address 
responsibility by requiring indemnification by UNFCCC Annex II Parties. Such schemes could 
fairly straightforwardly be made consistent with a more comprehensive and Party-specific 
indicator of responsibility. For example, Tuvalu has proposed a Climate Change Insurance Fund 
to cover the costs associated with climate change that would be financed in part through a levy 
on fossil fuel sales in UNFCCC Annex I (Government of Tuvalu, 2005).  
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Local solutions with accountability 
Few insurance proposals focus on the details of designing and implementing locally-based, 
location-specific adaptation measures, as the focus is on compensation for damages. 
Embryonic ideas 
Below we briefly refer to three additional ideas of potential interest. These are less well 
documented than the options discussed above and are not yet sufficiently developed to be 
analysed in terms of their links to development, responsibility, and local solutions with 
accountability.  
Market-based mechanisms for achieving adaptation  
There has been some discussion, though little detailed elaboration, of market-based mechanisms 
to encourage adaptation by creating a market in ‘adaptation credits’ or ‘vouchers’ (e.g., 
Schelnhuber & Cornell, 2003), which could be traded among Parties that have a responsibility 
for facilitating adaptation or paying compensation to satisfy certain “adaptation targets”. 
Adaptation credits could be allocated and transferred to private sector entities.  
The obvious difficulty with such a scheme is that it requires adaptation to be quantified and 
translated into an fungible commodity, which private sector actors could then capably deliver 
based on a profit-driven incentive. A further concern is that any market that permitted the 
fungibility of adaptation and mitigation may invite the risk of under-mitigating and place too 
much confidence in future adaptation opportunities. Finally, there are uncertain transaction 
costs. 
It is possible to consider combining some these options with various mechanisms for generating 
adaptation funding. Among the funding mechanisms that have been raised are the following:  
A tax on aviation fuels 
An idea which has been floated in the EU, promoted by France and to a lesser extent by 
Germany and other EU member states, is to establish a tax on aviation fuels at international 
level and to use the revenues it would generate to finance climate-related activities in 
developing countries, including adaptation activities (Muller and Hepburn, 2006c). The 
advantages of such a tax system would be that it puts a price on the pollution caused by aviation 
and that it would result in new resources for funding adaptation. The Chicago Convention of 
1944, under which signatories have exempted aviation fuels from taxation on international 
flights to ensure ‘fair international competition’, is a barrier to the introduction of such a tax. 
The current US government objects to removing this exemption, and also to the imposition of 
any taxes on intra-European flights carried out by US airlines (Swiss Agency for Development 
Cooperation, 2005).  
A similar tax could be envisaged for other fuels, such as ‘bunker’ fuels used for ships.  A tax 
could also be introduced on airfares instead of on the fuel used for the flight. A tax on GHG 
emissions, or GHG intensity, could be introduced. This has the benefit that it is most directly 
connected to total national emissions and national responsibility.  18 | KARTHA, BHANDARI, VAN SCHAIK, CORNLAND & KJELLÉN 
A levy on Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) obtained through Emissions Trading and Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs) obtained by Joint Implementation (JI) projects, similar to the levy on 
CDM projects 
In the UNFCCC negotiations, developing countries have raised the issue of why an adaptation  
levy exists on CDM projects only. A similar construct could be envisaged for Emissions 
Trading and JI projects. Countries currently benefiting most from JI, i.e. countries with 
economies in transition with large surplus emissions, are opposed to this idea.  
5 Closing  comments 
In summary, a climate regime that attempts to address adaptation is faced by a number of 
recurrent questions including the following:   
•  How can the link to human development be internalised into adaptation efforts? There are 
intrinsic similarities between activities that enhance adaptive capacity and those that 
advance basic development. This suggests that it may be counterproductive to attempt to 
draw a firm distinction between adaptation projects and other development efforts. It also 
suggests that there are significant lessons to be learned from ODA experience, and that there 
is much known that can be used to start investing in adaptive capacity immediately.  
•  How and to whom should responsibility be attributed? A certain amount of climate change 
is now inevitable, and adaptation to limit the damages will require considerable resources, 
especially in developing countries. Industrialised countries, with their GHG emissions per 
capita much in excess of the global average, have a certain  legal and moral responsibility to 
provide resources, as well as practical reasons for wanting to do so. 
•  How can adaptation needs be identified and prioritised in a manner that respects the local 
nature of adaptation? Implementing adaptive responses is a very location-specific 
endeavour, implying that an the intimate involvement of local communities is a key 
ingredient for effective implementation. At the same time, activities at higher levels (sub-
national, national, or international) can provide a facilitate role, in order to enable successful 
local adaptation. 
•  What would be effective and appropriate institutions or mechanisms for achieving adequate 
levels of adaptation? In other words, what institutions or mechanisms would effectively take 
into account the intrinsic links with development, the twin objectives of facilitation and 
implementation of local responses, and the need to provide adequate resources by relating 
funding commitments to national responsibility.  
The scientific and empirical findings that have led to an increased sense of urgency with regard 
to mitigation also are now also precipitating a more urgent response on adaptation. The dialogue 
at the October ECP seminar focussed on issues related to constructing an adaptation regime with 
the aim of supporting and achieving adaptation in developing countries at a level that is 
commensurate with the challenge. In this report, we have sought to set out some of the relevant 
background, including three fundamental characteristics of adaptation for consideration when 
attempting to define a viable regime. | 19 
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APPENDIX 1 − Political Declaration on Financial Support for Developing 
Countries, Bonn, June 2001 
The pledge for new and additional funding was issued by Belgium (on behalf of the European 
Community and its member states, along with Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and 
Switzerland) in the following Political Declaration on Financial Support for Developing 
Countries:  
‘‘We, the aforementioned Annex II Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, fully recognize the need to provide financial resources 
to developing countries, in accordance with our commitments under Article 4.3, 4.4, 
4.5, 4.8 and 4.9 of the Convention….”  
“We reaffirm our strong political commitment to climate change funding for developing 
countries. We are prepared to contribute US$410 million, which is 450 million Euro, 
per year by 2005 with this level to be reviewed in 2008. Funding to be counted can 
include: contributions to GEF climate change related activities; bilateral and multilateral 
funding additional to current levels; funding for the special climate change funds, the 
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund and the LDC fund; and funding deriving from the 
share of proceeds of the Clean Development Mechanism following entry into force of 
the Kyoto Protocol. We invite all the Parties to contribute also”. [Implementation of the 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action, Statements made in Connection with the Approval of the 
Bonn Agreements on the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (Decision 
5/CP.6) (FCCC/CP/2001/MISC.4, 23 October 2001]. 
The five-year programme of action has two sub-themes. The scope of work for the ‘Impacts and 
Vulnerability’ sub-theme comprises: “(i) Promoting development and dissemination of 
methodologies and tools for … assessments…, (ii) Improving … information on current and 
historical climate and its impacts [and] … , (iii) ... on projected climate change; (iv) Promoting 
understanding of impacts .. and vulnerability…, (v) … [including] the socio-economic aspects 
…” The scope of work of the “Adaptation Planning, Measures and Actions” sub-theme 
comprises: “(i)…Promoting … methods and tools for adaptation…, (ii) Collecting, analysing 
and disseminating information on … practical adaptation…, (iii) Promoting research on 
adaptation…, (iv) Facilitating communication and cooperation… , (v) Promoting understanding 
and measures, methodologies and tools including for economic diversification…” | 25 
APPENDIX 2 − Funds for adaptation under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
Support for adaptation is provided by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Special 
Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Country Fund and the Adaptation Fund.  
GEF support for adaptation comes in three stages. Stage I provided support for the national 
communication process, a portion of which is the vulnerability and adaptation assessment.
28 
Stage II provides further assistance for other capacity-building efforts for adaptation. The 
forthcoming Stage III is intended to support actual adaptation activities, including insurance, 
and has been implemented in the form of the GEF Strategic Priority on Adaptation. In Stage I 
and II, the available resources for adaptation assessments are not particularly large given that 
the product is intended to be comprehensive enough to support development planning.  
With respect to Stage III, the start of actual adaptation activities has been hampered by several 
issues: the challenge of applying the GEF incremental cost and global benefits criteria to 
adaptation; the disinclination of GEF donors to commit GEF funds to what they may view as 
open-ended adaptation, and a lack of success by developing countries to secure guidance to the 
GEF to support Stage III adaptation. Mace (2005) gives the example of the repeated calls on the 
part of the Small Island Developing States “for insurance mechanisms to enhance their adaptive 
capacity to increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather events, and to storm surges 
worsened by sea level rise. These calls have been burdened by linkages with Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) issues, and undermined by US efforts to downplay any 
relationship between extreme weather events and human-induced climate change”. (Mace, 
2005). Overall, the adaptation resources from GEF have supported preparatory work and 
assessments, but not yet covered substantive implementation of actual adaptation measures. As 
expressed in a submission from Canada, “the priority assigned to the Strategic Approach to 
Adaptation isn’t, in our view, consistent with the increased attention being paid to adaptation in 
the convention and COP decisions” (Canada, 2005). 
The Special Climate Change Fund was established to finance developing country activities in 
(1) adaptation, (2) technology transfer, (3) key sectors (energy, transport, industry, agriculture, 
forestry and waste management), and (4) economic diversification for countries with economies 
dependent on the fossil fuel sector. There are projects approved or in the pipeline in Tanzania, 
Ecuador, Barbados, Fiji, Uzbekistan, Jordan, the Andean Region, Pacific Islands and India. The 
SCCF funds are available on a sliding scale, as a percentage of the full projects costs (ranging 
from 25% to 50% depending on project size, with any larger portion of SCCF funding requiring 
a justification for the additional support). Developing countries (including AOSIS and the LDC 
Group) have registered concerns that the co-financing required by the sliding scale will preclude 
many countries from accessing the fund.  
The  Least Developed Country Fund was established to support preparation and 
implementation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action − a prioritised list of urgent and 
immediate adaptation projects, identifying those priority activities “whose further delay could 
increase vulnerability, or lead to increased costs at a later stage” (decision 28/CP.7). 
Contentious discussions continue regarding which activities will be eligible for full-cost funding 
and which will require co-financing.  
The Adaptation Fund is intended to fund concrete adaptation projects and programmes in 
developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 
The funding is provided by a 2% levy on proceeds from Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) projects (excluding those undertaken in LDCs), and “other sources”. The total scale of 
                                                      
28 The total allowance for the combined mitigation and V&A assessments was capped at $130,000 (of the 
$350,000 budget) per 1
st National Communications, and expanded to $150,000 (of the $420,000 budget) 
per 2
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the Adaptation Fund will therefore depend on the volume of CERs purchased through the CDM 
and the market value of those CERs. Based on a World Bank estimate (Gorman, 2006) of 
current CDM projects in the pipeline and an assumed CER market value of $15/CER,
29 the fund 
would hypothetically stand at $102 million at present. Low and high estimates (of 900 million 
tonnes of carbon equivalent (MtC) and 2000 MtC respectively) for the 1
st Commitment Period 
volume of CERs yield estimates of $270 M and $600 M for the total scale of the Adaptation 
Fund.  
                                                      
29 The value of the Adaptation Fund levy would depend on the market price of CERs, which is impossible 
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Table 1. Overview of UNFCCC-related funds for adaptation support 
Fund Purpose  Amount 
earmarked 
 
($) 
Amount 
disbursed   
(or in the 
pipeline) 
($) 
Disbursement 
basis 
GEF I 
 
To fund first and second national 
communications
a 
$130m  $80m  Full cost funding 
GEF II 
 
Capacity building for adaptation  $60m    Full cost funding 
GEF III 
Strategic 
Priority on 
Adaptation 
   
Pilot and demonstration projects 
that both address local adaptation 
needs and generate global 
environmental benefits in the GEF 
focal areas 
 
Also, community-based adaptation 
activities under the GEF’s Small 
Grants Programme 
$50m 
 
 
 
$5m 
~$15m  ‘Incremental cost’ for 
generating global 
environmental 
benefits 
 
LDCF  Prioritisation and implementation of 
most urgent and immediate 
adaptation projects to address the 
needs of LDCs based on National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action 
(NAPA) 
 
$41.4m $9.6m 
 
‘Additional costs’ for 
meeting adaptation 
needs 
SCCF  Activities, programmes and 
measures in:  
(1) Adaptation, (2) technology 
transfer, (3) economic 
diversification, and (4) key sectors 
(energy, transport, industry, 
agriculture, forestry and waste 
management) 
 
$32m  ~$32m  Sliding scale:  
25%-50%, depending 
on project size 
Adaptation 
Fund 
Concrete adaptation projects and 
programmes in developing country 
Parties that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change 
 
2% of CDM 
revenue 
$270-600m 
(based on low 
and high 2012 
estimate)
30 
$102m (Based 
on current CDM 
pipeline) 
 
Yet to be determined 
a the funding for vulnerability and adaptation corresponds only to part of the allocated funds, ~35% for 2nd national 
communications 
                                                      
30  Institutional Arrangements for Adaptation Fund: World Bank view, presented at the UNFCCC 
Workshop on the Adaptation Fund, 3 May 2006, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, by Steve Gorman of the 
World Bank, Global Environment Operations.  | 28 
APPENDIX 3 – Mainstreaming adaptation into the ODA system 
When considering the option of achieving adequate adaptation by internalising it into the 
existing bilateral and multilateral ODA infrastructure, it is worth starting by looking at how 
ODA as it is today would need to change to become consistent with the challenge of climate 
adaptation. To be more consistent with the existing adaptation challenge, three overarching 
questions need to be taken into account. 
Quantity of ODA efforts: What implications do climate change vulnerability and adaptation 
have for the total quantity of ODA demanded by the challenge of global development?  
The impacts of climate change clearly make it harder to achieve development objectives. In the 
words of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,
31 “all countries must now do their utmost to 
combat climate change and to keep it from undermining our efforts to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals”. Attaining development goals will require more ambitious development 
cooperation efforts when taking climate change into account. Relative to total ODA flows, 
estimates of the total economic costs of climate change impacts (see Box 1) are not 
insignificant, which implies that extra ODA will be needed to address the impacts felt by poor 
communities and households.  
Choice of ODA efforts: What does climate change vulnerability and adaptation imply for the 
choice of ODA efforts?  
ODA portfolios may need to change in response to the threat of climate change and the need to 
integrate adaptation. For example, measures aimed at involving communities in replanting and 
protecting mangrove (World Bank, 2003; Box 5) might become a more necessary development 
intervention in the context of a changing climate, as opposed to competing interventions (e.g. 
shrimp farming) that have traditionally been favoured for their immediate economic growth 
benefits (Klein et al., 2005). More development cooperation attention might also need to be 
given to disaster preparedness and disaster relief, owing to the expected increase in extreme 
weather events and droughts caused by a changing climate.  
Design of ODA efforts: What does climate change vulnerability and adaptation imply for the 
design of ODA efforts?  
The prospect of a changing climate and increased climatic variability imply that there are 
additional risks for long-term development investments that need to be screened (Burton and 
van Aalst, 2004; Klein et al, 2005, World Bank, 2006b) to:  
1.  identify where the development activity itself is vulnerable and suggest ways to make 
the activity more robust to climate variability and change  
2.  recognise how climate change may alter the ability of a vulnerable community (or 
ecosystem) to benefit from the development activity  
3.  discover how a project may affect the target community’s vulnerability to climate 
change, either positively or negatively  
(These three steps in particular are sometimes referred to as ‘climate proofing’ development.) 
The ability to answer these questions and internalise the necessary changes into the ODA 
system is necessary in and of itself, but it also would be a precondition before the ODA system 
could bear the additional burden of delivering the full range of adaptation activities that will be 
needed. 
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